Korea's Developmental Alliance by David Hundt

Korea's Developmental Alliance by David Hundt

Author:David Hundt [Hundt, David]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: Development, Korea (South) - Economic Policy, Economics, Korea (South) - Economic Conditions, Korea (South), Economic Development, Business and Politics, Economic Conditions, Political Science, International, Business and Politics - Korea (South), Korea (South) - Politics and Government, Business & Economics, Economic Development - Korea (South)
ISBN: 9780415466684
Google: lIDlnQJt3EwC
Amazon: 0415466687
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 2008-12-02T18:30:00+00:00


Retrenching the state?

As mentioned in the previous chapter, Park Chung Hee’s assassination resulted from disagreement within the regime about the appropriate response to deteriorating socio-economic and international conditions. A recession coincided with Park’s relations with the US reaching a nadir in the late 1970s. For these reasons the conditions were not ripe for the emergence of a civilian regime. Park and his contemporaries abhorred what they considered to be the decadence of the political class. They considered civilian politicians, such as Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung, to be unqualified to lead the country. A younger class of military leaders, centred on Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo, seized power within the armed forces and in national politics. Chun and Roh assumed control of the military - and also the powerful

Korean Central Intelligence Agency - in December 1979, actions that would earn them jail terms in the 1990s. Choi Kyu-hah was to serve as caretaker head of state but Chun and Roh were the most powerful figures in the country (Cumings 1997).

Popular opposition to the continuation of military rule was strong, especially in the southwestern Jeolla province. This region had been neglected during the process of economic development. Most industrial complexes were built in the Gyeongsang province, Jeolla’s rival. The Jeolla people considered themselves to be victims of discrimination within their own country, especially since the Park regime arrested and tried to assassinate the region’s most revered statesman, Kim Dae-jung. With the end of the regime, the Jeolla people hoped that Kim would become president after narrowly losing in 1971 amid credible allegations of vote rigging. The regime had also imprisoned the other prominent opposition leader, Kim Young-sam. The harassment of these political leaders encouraged dissent among their supporters. Kim Young-sam’s supporters rallied near his hometown in the southeastern cities of Busan and Masan. The most extensive display of opposition to the new regime was in Gwangju, the capital of Jeolla. Weeks of demonstrations culminated in a popular revolt and a subsequent violent repression by security forces. The death toll was later estimated to be in the hundreds (Presidential Truth Commission 2004).

Chun and Roh solidified their grip on power after crushing the Gwangju uprising in May 1980. Chun assumed power as acting president later that year. The election of Ronald Reagan at the end of 1980 strengthened the position of Chun, who was sworn in as Korean president in early 1981. The events of 1980 appeared to merely affirm to the US that it needed a ‘stable’ ally in Korea. Given the history of America’s clientistic relations during the Cold War, it came as no surprise that ‘stability’ usually connoted support for military regimes. Chun had the honour of being the first foreign head of state to visit the Reagan White House (Cumings 1997).

The ascension of the Chun regime also signalled change to economic policy. Kim Jae-ik, who had served in the bureaucracy since his return from the US in the early 1970s, advocated ‘stabilisation’ and liberalisation to respond to the recession that followed the HCI drive in the 1970s.



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